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. Introduction
The grieving wife attempts in vain to muffle her sobs as she recounts her
final minutes with her late husband.' The long pauses between her statements
create a screaming silence. Members of the gallery nervously look to the floor,
trying not to make eye contact with the wife for fear that they, too, will erupt
into tears. Next, the prosecution calls the victim's son to the witness stand.
I. See Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 827 (1991) (finding that the Eighth
Amendment does not create a per se bar to the introduction of victim impact statements).
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Stories of childhood memories follow, and a wave of sadness washes over the
jury. Most of the jurors intermittently blot tears. Members of the gallery try to
restrain their emotions. The prosecution then plays a videotape. The tape
depicts the victim at his children's birthday parties, opening presents excitedly
with his family on Christmas morning, and helping his child learn to ride a
bike. As the videotape reaches the half-hour mark, the silence has melted into a
soft symphony of shudders and sobs. Upon the conclusion of the video, the
prosecutor rises. Pointing to the defendant while addressing the jury box, the
prosecutor recounts the defendant's entire criminal record, including incidents
for which he was never charged.2 The prosecutor also restates his claim that
the defendant committed the murder for pecuniary gain. At the conclusion, the
prosecutor pleads with the jury to find the defendant guilty of federal capital
murder and sentence him to death. In his final statement, he repeats to the jury:
"The defendant has killed before, don't let him kill again."
3
Surely American courts prohibit the introduction of such unfairly
prejudicial evidence during the adjudication of a criminal offense. Right? That
proposition holds true for all cases except one: The federal capital murder trial.
Under the bifurcated proceedings of the federal capital trial, a defendant facing
the death penalty is afforded fewer procedural protections than most defendants
charged with simple misdemeanors.4 Recent Supreme Court opinions call into
question the constitutionality of this structure. 5 A remedy for this problem,
however, rests not with repealing the Federal Death Penalty Act (FDPA), but
instead with trifurcating the proceedings. To understand both the problem and
the solution, it is necessary to have a basic grasp of the structure of federal
capital trials. Parts II-V of this Note provide the requisite background
materials, address the problem, and offer trifurcation as a possible solution.6
Parts VI-X posit four arguments supporting trifurcation of federal capital
2. See United States v. Grande, 353 F. Supp. 2d 623, 635-36 (E.D. Va. 2005)
(permitting the introduction of evidence that the defendant "has engaged in a pattern of criminal
activity as an adult"); United States v. Jones, 132 F.3d 232, 238 n.2 (5th Cir. 1998) (noting that
the prosecution had introduced evidence of the nonstatutory aggravating factor of future
dangerousness).
3. See Grande, 353 F. Supp. 2d at 638-39 (allowing the prosecution to introduce
evidence that the defendant "poses a future danger based upon the probability that he would
commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing threat to society").
4. See Alexander Bunin, When Trial and Punishment Intersect: New Defects in the
Death Penalty, 26 W. NEW ENG. L. REv. 233, 235 (2004) ("[I]n most death penalty
jurisdictions, a capital defendant is prosecuted for some elements of capital murder without the
trial protections available even to a person charged with a simple misdemeanor.").
5. See generally Bunin, supra note 4.
6. See infra Parts I-V (offering trifurcation as a possible solution to the current defects
in the structure of a federal capital murder trial).
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trials.7 Specifically, Part VI provides an overview of each argument.8 Part VII
argues that the rule against character evidence is embodied in the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment and as a result compels trifurcation.9 Part VIm
contends that the Supreme Court's recent opinion in Crawford mandates
trifurcation in certain situations.10 Next, Part IX argues that statutory
construction of the FDPA itself requires trifurcation. " The final argument is
described in Part X.12 This argument analyzes empirical data to reveal how
trifurcation can afford some measure of relief to problems associated with
capital jury decision making and the death penalty itself. The Note provides a
conclusion in Part XI.1
3
11. Current Structure of a Federal Capital Trial
Today, the proceedings of all federal capital trials are bifurcated .
4
Bifurcation means the trial is divided into a "guilt phase" and a "sentencing
phase." 5 The following subparts describe the structure and content of these
two phases.
A. Phase One: The Guilt Phase
The guilt phase mirrors what typically comes to mind when one thinks of a
criminal proceeding. During this phase, the jury determines whether the
7. See infra Parts VI-X (offering two constitutional arguments, a statutory construction
argument, and an empirical argument in support of trifurcation).
8. See infra Part VI (providing an overview of each argument).
9. See infra Part VII (providing the character evidence argument for trifurcation).
10. See infra Part VIII (offering a Confrontation Clause argument for trifurcation).
11. See infra Part IX (providing a statutory construction argument in support of
trifurcation).
12. See infra Part X (offering empirical evidence in support of trifurcation).
13. See infra Part XI (arguing that trifurcation might also be applicable to state death
penalty jurisdictions).
14. See Bunin, supra note 4, at 268 (stating that the Federal Death Penalty Act "requires a
separate punishment hearing").
15. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) (2000) (stating that if the defendant is found guilty of a
federal capital offense or pleads guilty to a capital offense, the trial then proceeds to a
"sentencing hearing"); Linda E. Jackson, Note, Be Careful What You Wish For: The
Constitutionality of the Federal Death PenaltyActAfter Ring v. Arizona, 43 BRANDEISL. J. 79,
81-82 (2004) (providing an explanation of the structure of the federal capital trial); Bunin,
supra note 4, at 244 (same); United States v. Matthews, 246 F. Supp. 2d 137, 141 (N.D.N.Y.
2002) (same).
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defendant is guilty of the underlying capital offense. 16 Upon the conclusion of
the guilt phase, the maximum punishment facing the defendant if he is found
guilty is life in prison.' 7 Only if the defendant is found guilty by the jury or has
pleaded guilty does the trial advance to the next phase-the sentencing phase.1
8
B. Phase Two: The Sentencing Phase
The jury must make two separate and distinct determinations during the
sentencing phase of the trial. 19 First, the jury must decide whether the
defendant is eligible for the death penalty; that is, the jury must resolve whether
the range of possible punishments includes death.2 ° Second, the jury must
agree upon an appropriate punishment.2'
1. Is the Defendant Eligible for the Death Penalty?
The prosecution must establish two distinct factors for the defendant to
be eligible for the death penalty-intent factors and statutory aggravating
factors. First, intent factors require the jury to find that the defendant had the
22appropriate mens rea. Intent factors include evidence that the defendant:
16. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(b) (2000) (requiring a "separate sentencing hearing to determine
the punishment to be imposed"); see also 18 U.S.C. § 3591(a)(1), (a)(2), & (b) (2000)
(enumerating federal capital offenses); Bunin, supra note 4, at 244 (stating that the "first phase
was designed to determine guilt").
17. See Bunin, supra note 4, at 235 ("Absent finding at least one statutory aggravating
circumstance by a jury beyond a reasonable doubt, the crime of capital murder is not proven and
the death penalty may not be considered."); Joshua Herman, Comment, Death Denies Due
Process: Evaluating Due Process Challenges to the Federal Death Penalty Act, 53 DEPAULL.
REV. 1777, 1801 (2004) ("If no aggravating factor is found, the death penalty may not be
imposed.").
18. See 18 U.S.C § 3593(b) (2000) (stating that if the defendant is found guilty of the
underlying capital offense the judge "shall conduct a separate sentencing hearing to determine
the punishment to be imposed").
19. See Bunin, supra note 4, at 237 (noting that during the sentencing phase, the capital
jury "deliberates upon two very different issues").
20. See United States v. Johnson, 362 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1099 (N.D. Iowa 2005)
(describing the two-part determination to be made by the capital jury).
21. See id. (stating that the sentencing phase has two components: "(1) the determination
of certain gateway factors, which make the death penalty available, and (2) determination, from
weighing of all aggravating and mitigating factors, of whether the death penalty is an
appropriate punishment").
22. See 18 U.S.C. § 3591(a)(2)(A)-(D) (2000) (providing an exhaustive list of requisite
mental states for the imposition of the death penalty). For purposes of this Note, these mens rea
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intentionally killed the victim, intentionally inflicted serious bodily injury
that resulted in the death of the victim, [or] intentionally participated in
an act, contemplating that the life of a person would be taken or intending
that lethal force would be used in connection with a person ... and the
victim died as a direct result of the act.
23
Second, in addition to finding at least one intent factor, the jury must
also consider whether the government has established beyond a reasonable
doubt at least one aggravating factor enumerated in the FDPA.24 Examples
of these statutory aggravating factors include the government establishing
that the underlying capital offense was committed "during the commission of
another crime," caused "[g]rave risk of death to additional persons," or was
committed for "[p]ecuniary gain. 2 5 It is important to remember that although
the defendant has been found guilty of the underlying offense in the guilt
phase, the jury cannot consider death as a possible punishment absent a
finding that the government has established at least one intent factor and one
statutory aggravating factor.2 6 Thus, capital juries must find these two factors
beyond a reasonable doubt before they may consider imposing the death
penalty.
2. Is Death the Appropriate Punishment?
In determining whether death is the appropriate punishment, the jury must
also consider nonstatutory aggravating factors and mitigating factors. The
government's presentation of nonstatutory aggravating factors, in addition to the
presentation of intent and statutory aggravating factors, begins to blur the
distinction between eligibility and punishment.27 Unlike statutory aggravating
requirements are called "intent factors."
23. Id. § 3591(a)(2)(AHC).
24. Id. §3593(e) (requiring that a statutory aggravating factor must be found before the
imposition of the death penalty); id. § 3593(c) (requiring that a statutory aggravating factor must
be "established beyond a reasonable doubt"). For purposes of this Note, these factors are
defined as "statutory aggravating factors."
25. See id. § 3592(c) (listing the statutory aggravating factors prescribed by the FDPA).
26. See id. § 3593(e) (requiring the jury to find a statutory aggravating factor before
imposing the death penalty); Herman, supra note 17, at 1801 (noting that the death penalty
cannot be considered if the government fails to establish a statutory aggravating factor beyond a
reasonable doubt).
27. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) (2000) (stating that during the sentencing phase of the trial,
"[i]nformation is admissible regardless of its admissibility under the rules governing admission
of evidence at criminal trials except that information may be excluded if its probative value is
outweighed by the danger of creating unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the
jury").
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factors, which must be established for the defendant to be eligible for the death
penalty, nonstatutory aggravating factors are neither sufficient nor necessary for
the jury to sentence the defendant to death.28 Only if the jury has first found the
existence of at least one intent factor and one statutory aggravating factor does
a nonstatutory aggravating factor become relevant to the jury's determination of
whether to impose the death penalty.29 There is no specific list of nonstatutory
aggravating factors.30 In fact, the FDPA states that "[a]t the sentencing hearing,
information may be presented as to any matter relevant to the sentence ....
Nonstatutory aggravating factors include, for example, the future
dangerousness of the defendant
32 and victim impact statements.
33
After the government has concluded its presentation of intent factors,
statutory aggravating factors, and nonstatutory aggravating factors, the defense
may offer evidence of mitigating factors.34 Mitigating factors are aspects of the
crime or of the defendant that the jury must take into account when deciding
upon the appropriate punishment.35 For example, if the jury is satisfied that the
defendant meets the eligibility requirements for the death penalty, the jury must
then consider whether the presence of a mitigating factor justifies a reduction in
28. See id. § 3593(e) (requiring that in addition to the underlying statutory offense, at
least one statutory aggravating factor must be established in order for the defendant to be
eligible for the death penalty); United States v. Lentz, 225 F. Supp. 2d 672, 682 (E.D. Va. 2002)
(stating that "the Defendant could not be sentenced to death based solely upon the jurors'
finding of non-statutory aggravating factors").
29. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(e) (2000) (implying that the jury is to consider nonstatutory
aggravating factors in its determination as to whether death is the appropriate punishment);
United States v. Mikos, No. 02 CR 137-1,2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16044, at *19 (N.D. Ill. Sept.
11, 2003) ("Consideration of non-statutory aggravating factors only assists the jury in
individualizing the sentence; they never affect the maximum sentence.").
30. For example, in the federal capital murder trial of Louis Jones, the prosecution
introduced the nonstatutory aggravating factor of the victim's "young age, her slight stature, her
background, and her unfamiliarity with San Angelo, Texas." United States v. Jones, 132 F.3d
232, 238 (5th Cir. 1998).
31. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) (2000).
32. See Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 307-08 (2002) (noting that the prosecution
introduced evidence of future dangerousness at the sentencing phase of the trial); Bunin, supra
note 4, at 254 (citing Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 162-63 (1994) for the
proposition that evidence of future dangerousness is admissible during the sentencing phase).
33. See Bunin, supra note 4, at 255 (noting that victim impact statements are routinely
admitted during the sentencing phase of a capital trial).
34. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) (2000) (stating that at the sentencing phase "[t]he defendant
may present any information relevant to a mitigating factor").
35. See id. § 3592(a) (stating that in "determining whether a sentence of death is to be
imposed on a defendant, the finder of fact shall consider any mitigating factor") (emphasis
added). For an excellent description of mitigating factors, see United States v. Jones, 132 F.3d
232, 238-39 n.3 (5th Cir. 1998).
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the sentence to life in prison. Mitigating factors include, but are not limited to,
evidence such as impaired capacity, duress, minor participation, equally
culpable defendants, and the defendant having no prior criminal record.36 The
defense need only establish mitigating factors by a preponderance of the
evidence.37
3. Jury Deliberations
The sentencing phase culminates with the jury entering deliberations.38
Thejury is charged with making two separate and distinction determinations. 3
First, the jury must decide whether the defendant is eligible for the death
penalty. 0 Second, assuming the defendant is eligible for the death penalty, the
jury must consider whether "all the aggravating factor or factors found to exist
sufficiently outweigh all the mitigating factor or factors found to exist to justify
a sentence of death.",41 Or in the "absence of a mitigating factor, [the jury must
also determine] whether the aggravating factor or factors alone are sufficient to
justify a sentence of death. '42 The jury may sentence the defendant to death
only if it is unanimous.43
While this discussion of the bifurcated federal capital trial appears to
compartmentalize neatly the decision making process of the jury, the reality is
that the deliberations function quite differently. Again, the jury must make a
two-part determination." They must resolve whether the defendant is eligible
for the death penalty, and if so, whether death is the appropriate punishment.45
However, the jury hears all of the evidence of intent factors, statutory
36. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(a) (2000) (providing a non-exhaustive list of mitigating factors).
37. See id. § 3593(c) (stating that a mitigating factor is not established "unless the
existence of such a factor is established by a preponderance of the information").
38. See id. § 3593(d) (stating that the jury "shall consider all the information received
during the [sentencing] hearing"); Bunin, supra note 4, at 268 (noting that the jury must "weigh
aggravating and mitigating factors" during the sentencing hearing).
39. See supra notes 20-21 (describing the two-part determination).
40. See Bunin, supra note 4, at 268 (noting that the jury must first determine whether the
defendant is eligible for the death penalty).
41. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(e) (2000).
42. Id.
43. See id. (requiring unanimity among the jurors before the defendant becomes death
eligible).
44. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text (describing the two-part
determination).
45. See supra notes 20-21 (discussing the decision making process of a federal capital
jury during the sentencing phase).
THE CASE FOR TRIFURCATION
aggravating factors, nonstatutory aggravating factors, and mitigating factors in a
single proceeding before making these two determinations. 46 Receiving all of
this information in a unitary proceeding creates a problem because the jury's
determination of whether the defendant is eligible for the death penalty may be
influenced by irrelevant evidence.47 The jury may find the defendant eligible
for the death penalty based on evidence that, even if established beyond a
reasonable doubt, fails to satisfy the statutory requirements of death eligibility.48
Consider the example at the beginning of this Note.49 The prosecutor
introduced evidence to establish the statutory aggravating factor that the crime
was committed for pecuniary gain.5° In addition, the government also
introduced evidence of a nonstatutory aggravating factor-victim impact
statements. 5I In theory, the jury must separate the two in its determination of
whether the defendant is death eligible.5 2  In this example, the jury's
determination of whether the government has established that the crime was
committed for pecuniary gain must not be influenced by evidence of the victim
impact statements. The problem is that these mental gymnastics are nearly
impossible for almost anyone, especially the average juror who more than likely
lacks background knowledge concerning the FDPA. 3 The end result is that the
issue of eligibility and punishment melt into a singular assessment.54
Moreover, nonstatutory aggravating factors, such as victim impact statements,
46. See supra notes 20-21 and accompanying text.
47. See United States v. Johnson, 362 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1106 (N.D. Iowa 2005) (citing
Joshua D. Greenberg, Is Payne Defensible?: The Constitutionality ofAdmitting Victim-Impact
Evidence at Capital Sentencing Hearings, 75 IND. L.J. 1349, 1365-66 n.87 (2000), for the
proposition that victim impact statements are irrelevant to the determination of whether the
defendant is eligible for the death penalty).
48. See Bunin, supra note 4, at 270 (discussing the potential problem that the jury's
determination of whether to impose the death penalty might be influenced by irrelevant factors).
49. See supra Part I (providing an example of a federal capital murder trial).
50. See 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c)(8) (2000) (enumerating "pecuniary gain" as an aggravating
factor).
51. See id. § 3593(c) (providing that "[a]t the sentencing hearing, information may be
presented as to any matter relevant to the sentence," which necessarily includes victim impact
statements).
52. See id. § 3593(e) (requiring that the jury first determine whether statutory aggravating
factors have been established before considering the impact of other evidence on its
determination of the appropriate punishment).
53. See, e.g., Bunin, supra note 4, at 262 (citing Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006,
1007 (2d Cir. 1934) (Hand, J.) (noting the virtual impossibility of curing the admission of
prejudicial information with a limiting instruction)).
54. See id. at 270 (discussing the possibility that the jury's determination of whether the
defendant is eligible for the death penalty may be improperly influenced by irrelevant factors).
64 WASH. & LEE L. REV 349 (2007)
can be extremely powerful. 55  The potential influence of nonstatutory
aggravating factors on the jury's eligibility decision lies at the heart of this
Note.
III. Recent Supreme Court Opinions and the Adequacy of the Bifurcated
Structure
This Part describes recent Supreme Court decisions that call into question
the adequacy of the current bifurcated structure of federal capital trials. Until
the year 2000, the potential influence of nonstatutory aggravating factors on the
jury's determination of death eligibility did not give rise to constitutional
concerns. 56  The Supreme Court considered intent factors and statutory
aggravating factors to be merely sentencing factors, not elements of the crime.57
All three factors-intent, statutory, and nonstatutory-as traditional sentencing
factors, were discretionary factors that the judge or jury could consider when
deciding upon the appropriate punishment. 58  Because intent factors and
statutory aggravating factors were not considered elements of the crime, all of
the elements of federal capital murder were adjudicated in the guilt phase. So
long as the guilt phase afforded the defendant all of the requisite constitutional
trappings, there was no concern over the potential for the jury to confuse the
issues of eligibility and punishment during the sentencing phase. In addition to
the Court's jurisprudence as to what constitutes an element of an offense, the
Supreme Court had also indicated in older cases that the bifurcated structure
55. See United States v. Johnson, 362 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1107 (N.D. Iowa 2005) (noting
that the victim impact statement was the "most forceful, emotionally powerful, and emotionally
draining evidence that I have heard in any kind of proceeding in any case, civil or criminal, in
my entire career as a practicing trial attorney and federal judge spanning nearly 30 years").
56. See Bunin, supra note 4, at 245 ("Until recently, there did not appear to be a conflict
between traditional sentencing law, modem capital sentencing procedure, and the right to ajury
trial.").
57. See Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 648 (1990) (finding statutory aggravating
factors to be sentencing factors), overruled by Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002); Bunin,
supra note 4, at 257-58 (stating that before Ring v. Arizona statutory aggravating factors were
not considered elements of the crime); Major Mark A. Visger, The Impact ofRing v. Arizona on
Military Capital Sentencing, 2005 ARMY LAw. 71, 78 (2005) ("Prior to Ring, courts treated
aggravating factors as mere sentencing considerations and not elements to [sic] an offense.").
58. See Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 110-11 (2003) (implying that statutory
aggravating factors were previously not considered elements of the crime); Bunin, supra note 4,
at 244 (stating that before Apprendi and Ring statutory aggravating factors were simply
sentencing factors).
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that pervades today's federal capital trials provides the degree of reliability
necessary to satisfy the Eighth Amendment.59
The Supreme Court's opinion in Apprendi v. New Jersey6° called into
question this model for understanding what constitutes an element of a crime
61and what constitutes a sentencing factor. In Apprendi the Supreme Court held
that any fact which increases the statutory maximum punishment must be
62treated as an element of the crime. Accordingly, such a factor must be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt. 63 Despite Apprendi, not until the Supreme Court's
opinion in Ring v. Arizona64 did it become clear that intent factors and statutory
59. See Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 204 (1976) (noting that "it is desirable for the
jury to have as much information before it as possible when it makes the sentencing decision");
Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304 (1976) (noting that "[iln capital cases the
fundamental respect for humanity underlying the Eighth Amendment... requires consideration
of the character and record of the individual offender and the circumstances of the particular
offense as a constitutionally indispensable part of the process of inflicting the penalty of death");
United States v. Lentz, 225 F. Supp. 2d 672, 683 (E.D. Va. 2002) (noting that "[w]hat is
essential is that the jury have before it all possible relevant information about the individual
defendant whose fate it must determine") (citing Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262, 276 (1976));
Bunin, supra note 4, at 244 (noting that the Supreme Court found that the current bifurcated
structure that pervades today's federal capital trials adequately addresses Eighth Amendment
concerns). It is important to note that these Supreme Court opinions were decided well before
intent and statutory aggravating factors became elements of the crime of federal capital murder.
Instead, when these opinions were announced, intent and statutory aggravating factors were
considered simply sentencing factors. Therefore, the bifurcated structure of the federal capital
trial did not raise constitutional concerns.
60. See Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 490 (2000) (requiring that "any fact that
increases the penalty for a crime beyond the prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to
a jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt"). In Apprendi the Supreme Court considered
whether a New Jersey Statute that permitted a trial judge to increase the sentence length of a
crime beyond the statutory maximum based upon a determination, made by a preponderance of
the evidence, that the crime was committed "with a purpose to intimidate an individual or group
of individuals because of race, color, gender, handicap, religion, sexual orientation or ethnicity"
violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 468. Apprendi was
arrested for firing a weapon at the home of an African American family. Id. at 469-70. As a
result, Apprendi pleaded guilty to, among other crimes, "second degree possession of a firearm
for an unlawful purpose." Id. at 469. The statutory maximum for this count was ten years. Id.
at 470. However, based on a determination made by a preponderance of the evidence that this
crime was racially motivated, the judge enhanced the sentence to twelve years. Id. at 471.
Drawing on tradition and recent precedent, the Supreme Court found that New Jersey's
procedure, which effectively removed the jury from the determination of guilt or innocence,
violated the Due Process Clause. Id. at 490.
61. See id. at 490 (requiring that "any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond




64. See Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 609 (2002) ("Because Arizona's enumerated
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aggravating factors enumerated in the FDPA are also elements of the crime.65
In Ring, the Court held that any fact that can increase the severity of
punishment to death must be treated as the "functional equivalent" of an
66element of the crime. Under current Supreme Court precedent, intent factors
and statutory aggravating factors are elements of the crime of federal capital
murder.67
aggravating factors operate as the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense...
the Sixth Amendment requires that they be found by ajury."). The issue presented in Ring was
whether an aggravating factor required to be found before imposing a death sentence may be
found by ajudge and not the jury. Id. at 597. Timothy Ring was convicted of felony murder by
an Arizona jury. Id. at 591-92. Under an Arizona statute, once the jury found a defendant
guilty of murder, a sentence of death could be imposed only upon a finding by the judge of
certain aggravating factors. Id. at 592-93. Accordingly, the trial judge sentenced Timothy Ring
to death after concluding that Ring had committed the crime for pecuniary gain and that the
crime was committed in a particularly "heinous, cruel or depraved manner." Id. at 594-95.
Drawing heavily on its recent precedent in Apprendi, the Supreme Court: (1) ruled that
Arizona's procedure violated Ring's Sixth Amendment right to a trial by Jury and (2) expressly
overturned its opinion in Walton v. Arizona. Id. at 609.
65. See id. at 609 (stating that factors that can increase the penalty imposed to that of
death are the "functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense").
66. See id. (stating that findings which are required to be made before imposing a
sentence of death "operate as the functional equivalent of an element of a greater offense").
67. See id. (characterizing as elements factors that increase a criminal penalty to death);
see also Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101, 110-11 (2003) (plurality opinion) (affirming
the reasoning of Ring that the "existence of any fact ... [which] increases the maximum
punishment that may be imposed... constitutes an element, and must be found by a jury
beyond a reasonable doubt"); K. Brent Tomer, Ring Around the Grand Jury: Informing Grand
Jurors of the Capital Consequences ofAggravating Facts, 17 CAP. DEF. J. 61, 62 (2004) ("The
statutory aggravating factors demarcated the line between life and death, and as such, the Court
concluded, were to be treated as elements of an aggravated offense of capital murder."); Bunin,
supra note 4, at 246-47 (discussing the implications of Ring on capital trials). There is some
dispute over whether a functionally equivalent element is the same as an element. Compare Julia
Marcelle Foy Hilliker, Note, The Evolving Meaning of the Fifth and Sixth Amendments:
Sentencing Effects ofAggravating Factors as Elements of the Crime, 80 NOTRE DAME L. REv.
403, 422-23 (2004) ("[W]here an aggravating factor can be used to increase the maximum
penalty, the elements of the crime consist of murder plus an aggravating factor"), with Catherine
M. Guastello, Comment, The Tail That Wags the Dog: The Evolution of Elements, Sentencing
Factors and the Functional Equivalent of Elements-Why Aggravating Factors Need To Be
Charged in the Indictment, 37 ARiz. ST. L.J. 199, 202 (2005) ("[W]e now have three levels of
facts with differing levels of constitutional protection: 1) elements which have full
constitutional protection... 2) functional equivalents of elements that have some constitutional
protection ... [and] 3) sentencing enhancements that have little or no constitutional
protections .... ."). Describing an element as a functional equivalent, however, must mean that
it is equivalent to an element. As equivalent, it must be treated no differently. Moreover, the
Supreme Court in Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania, 537 U.S. 101 (2003), began moving away from
the amorphous language of functional equivalence. In Sattazahn the Court noted that its recent
opinion in Apprendi had clarified what constitutes an "element of an offense." Id. at 111. The
Court continued: "Put simply, if the existence of any fact.., increases the maximum
360
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IV. The Problem
Because factors once considered simply sentencing factors are now
elements of the crime, the bifurcated trial structure set out in the FDPA raises
serious constitutional concerns. 6  Indeed, the determination of guilt or
innocence is now merged with the determination of punishment.69 This fact
alone goes against the very core of criminal prosecution. 70 In the context of the
FDPA, however, the problem is even more pronounced. The judge does not
apply the Federal Rules of Evidence when deciding whether to admit evidence
of intent factors, statutory aggravating factors, nonstatutory aggravating factors
and mitigating factors.7' Evidence that a court would never admit at trial, such
as victim impact statements, hearsay, and character evidence, is unquestionably
permissible at the sentencing phase.72 The only safeguard is the judge, who
"may... exclude... [evidence] if its probative value is outweighed by the
danger of creating unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the
jury.
7 3
punishment that may be imposed on a defendant, that fact-no matter how the State labels it-
constitutes an element, and must be found by ajury beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. Thus, this
Note treats intent factors and statutory aggravating factors as elements of the crime of federal
capital murder.
68. See Bunin, supra note 4, at 249 (questioning the constitutionality of the bifurcated
structure of most capital murder trials); Visger, supra note 57, at 78 ("Ring raised questions
about the method by which the government charges a defendant with a capital offense and
notifies him of the capital aggravating factors the government intends to prove."); Victoria
Johnson, Comment & Note, Elemental Facts: Did Ring v. Arizona Redefine Capital
Sentencing?, 16 REGENT U. L. Rv. 191, 231 (2003) (describing the constitutional confusion
that ensued after the Supreme Court's opinion in Ring).
69. See Bunin, supra note 4, at 236 ("Yet in most capital cases, the sentencing hearing
begins before all the elements of capital murder are decided.").
70. See Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 447 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("Criminal prosecution involves two determinations: whether the defendant is guilty or
innocent, and what the appropriate punishment should be if he is guilty.... This case involves
the unfairness that may result from an attempt to merge the two stages.").
71. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) (2000) (stating that in the sentencing phase "[i]nformation is
admissible regardless of its admissibility under the rules governing admission of evidence at
criminal trials").
72. See United States v. Higgs, 353 F.3d 281, 320-22 (4th Cir. 2003) (discussing the
admissibility of victim impact statements and obstruction ofjustice as nonstatutory aggravating
factors); United States v. Matthews, 246 F. Supp. 2d 137, 149 (N.D.N.Y. 2002) (permitting the
introduction of prior unadjudicated criminal actions as nonstatutory aggravating factors); Bunin,
supra note 4, at 251-57 (describing the types of evidence that would never be admitted during
the guilt phase but are routinely admitted during the sentencing phase).
73. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) (2000).
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Consider the example described at the beginning of this Note.74 The
prosecution's introduction of victim impact statements and the defendant's long
criminal record would be excluded during the guilt phase of the trial.75 While
probative for determining the defendant's appropriate punishment, the Federal
Rules of Evidence require the judge to exclude such evidence.76
During the sentencing phase of the bifurcated federal capital trial,
however, this type of evidence is admissible.77 Accordingly, the effect of this
procedure is that the jury's determination of the existence of an intent factor
and a statutory aggravating factor, now elements of the crime, is given none of
the protections afforded the other elements of the crime adjudicated in the guilt
phase.78 As Alexander Bunin remarks in the context of the bifurcated state
capital trial: "[I]n most death penalty jurisdictions, a capital defendant is
prosecuted for some elements of capital murder without the trial protections
available even to a person charged with a simple misdemeanor. 7 9 While the
Supreme Court has found that the Federal Rules of Evidence are not
constitutionally mandatory per se,8 ° it has not addressed the problems
associated with evidence of nonstatutory aggravating factors influencing the
jury's determination of intent and statutory aggravating factors.81 It is clear,
however, that the current bifurcated structure of federal capital trials, which
merges the determination of guilt with the determination of punishment,
impinges on the defendant's constitutional right to a fair trial.8 2
74. See supra Part I (providing a hypothetical federal capital trial sentencing phase).
75. See FED. R. EviD. 404(a) (prohibiting the introduction of the defendant's character or
previous bad acts as evidence that the defendant acted in conformity therewith on a certain
occasion).
76. See supra note 75 (summarizing Rule 404(a)).
77. See Bunin, supra note 4, at 251-57 (describing the types of evidence that are
permitted during the sentencing phase but would be excluded during the guilt phase); see also
18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) (2000) (expressly providing that the Federal Rules of Evidence do not
apply to the sentencing phase).
78. See Bunin, supra note 4, at 237 (stating that "[b]y deciding the capital elements at the
sentencing hearing, the defendant does not receive protections provided during the proof of guilt
for any other crime").
79. Id. at 235.
80. See Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 437 (2000) ("Congress retains the
ultimate authority to modify or set aside any judicially created rules of evidence and procedure
that are not required by the Constitution.").
81. See Bunin, supra note 4, at 275 (noting that "when the Supreme Court upheld a
relaxed evidentiary proceeding in capital cases, it was in reference to selecting punishment and
not to determining the elements of an offense").
82. See id. at 243 (describing the "unconstitutionality" of the current bifurcated capital
murder trial). This Note wants to be clear concerning its stance on juries. This Note does not
assume that juries cannot think critically. This Note does, however, argue that nonstatutory
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V. A Solution: Trifurcation
Very recently, a few federal district courts began trifurcating capital trials
to relieve some of the problems associated with the bifurcated structure
addressed in Part II. 3 The judge divides the trial into three phases under a
trifurcated structure: A guilt or merit phase, an eligibility phase, and a
sentencing phase. 84  As with the bifurcated structure, the jury determines
whether the defendant is guilty of the underlying capital offense during the
guilt phase.85 Also, just as under the bifurcated structure, even if the defendant
is found guilty, he is not yet eligible for the death penalty.86 The trial proceeds
aggravating factors must, at some level, taint the jury's analysis of intent factors and statutory
aggravating factors. This view is not held by all. See Timothy J. Heaphy, A Comment on Erin
McCampell's Tipping the Scales: Seeking Death Through Comparative Value Arguments, 63
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 421,430 (2006) (strongly contesting the view that juries are "easily misled
by a lawyer's rhetoric"). Heaphy characterizes this assertion as "patronizing" jurors. Id.
Instead, Heaphy draws upon his own prosecutorial experience to assert that "[j]urors generally
do as they are instructed, basing their decisions on the facts they find and the law as given by
the judge." Id. While Heaphy's personal experience is entitled to deference, extensive
empirical data demonstrate that despite their best efforts, jurors do sometimes base their
decisions on irrelevant information. See William J. Bowers et al., Foreclosed Impartiality in
Capital Sentencing: Jurors 'Predispositions, Guilt-Trial Experience, and Premature Decision
Making, 83 CORNELL L. REv. 1476, 1515-29 (1998) (revealing that many capital jurors do not
follow the law in making the life or death decision of whether the defendant should receive the
death penalty). Over half of the 916 capital jurors interviewed indicated that they had already
made their decision regarding whether to impose the death penalty before the conclusion of the
sentencing phase. Id. at 1495. Moreover, despite the fact that the death penalty is never
mandatory, some jurors indicated that their decision to impose the death penalty was based on a
mistaken belief that the law required them to do so upon finding the defending guilty of the
underlying offense. Id. at 1497. Therefore, this Note maintains that jurors are sometimes
influenced by irrelevant information-nonstatutory aggravating factors included-when
deciding whether the defendant is eligible for the death penalty.
83. See United States v. Johnson, 362 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1110-11 (N.D. Iowa 2005)
(trifurcating the proceedings of a federal capital trial); United States v. Bodkins, No.
04CR70083, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8747, at *13-14 (W.D. Va. May 11,2005) (same); United
States v. Jordan, 357 F. Supp. 2d 889, 904-05 (E.D. Va. 2005) ("Accordingly, if this case
reaches the penalty stage, the proceedings will be divided between the eligibility and selections
phases."); United States v. Mayhew, 380 F. Supp. 2d 936, 957 (S.D. Ohio 2005) ("The
Court... will bifurcate the sentencing phase on the theory that victim impact evidence has no
probative value with regard to the statutory aggravating factors or the mens rea requirement in
this case, but that such evidence carries with it a substantial risk of prejudicing the jury.");
United States v. Davis, 912 F. Supp. 938, 949 (E.D. La. 1996) (bifurcating the sentencing phase
of a capital trial).
84. See United States v. Johnson, 362 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1110-11 (N.D. Iowa 2005)
(providing an explanation of the structure of a trifurcated trial).
85. See id. at 1111 (describing the merits phase of a trifurcated trial).
86. See id. ("[I]f the defendant is found guilty in the first phrase of the trifurcated
proceedings... this case will enter the second phase.").
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to the eligibility phase only if the defendant has been found guilty or has
pleaded guilty to the underlying capital offense. As the name suggests, the jury
determines whether the defendant is eligible for the death penalty in this
phase.87 Accordingly, the government may present only evidence of intent
factors and statutory aggravating factors.88  Evidence of nonstatutory
aggravating factors is not permitted.89 Only if the jury finds that the
government has met its burden of proof that the defendant is eligible for the
death penalty will the trial proceed to the sentencing phase. 90 At this final
phase, having found the defendant eligible for the death penalty, the jury then
considers whether death is the appropriate punishment.
9'
VI. Arguments for Trifurcating the Federal Capital Trial
Trifircation is an intuitive solution to the problems associated with the
current structure of federal capital trials. 92 More importantly, trifurcation is one
approach that will cure the constitutional defects associated with bifurcation. 9
This Note first contends that trifurcation is mandatory for the federal capital
trial to comply with the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.94
Second, in certain cases, it argues that trifurcation is necessary to quell
Confrontation Clause concerns. 95 Third, it holds that statutory construction of
the FDPA itself, especially in light of Apprendi and Ring, compels
trifurcation.96 Finally, it reasons that trifurcation is responsive to empirical
87. See id. (describing the eligibility phase).
88. See id. ("[A]n eligibility phrase will involve only argument, instruction, and
deliberation on the gateway factors ... and the statutory aggravating factors ... that the
government has identified as applicable here .... ").
89. See Johnson, 363 F. Supp. 2d at 111 (permitting the prosecution to establish only the
existence of statutory aggravating factors during the eligibility phase).
90. See id. (stating that "there will be no penalty phase" if the jury fails to find a statutory
aggravating factor).
91. See id. (noting that the jury will determine whether death is the appropriate
punishment in the penalty phase).
92. See supra Part IV (describing the constitutional deficiencies associated with the
bifurcated structure of federal capital trials).
93. Id.
94. See infra Part VII (arguing that the rule prohibiting the introduction of character
evidence is a constitutional right under the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment).
95. See infra Part VIII (offering a Confrontation Clause argument for trifurcation).
96. See infra Part IX (offering a statutory construction argument in support of
trifurcation).
THE CASE FOR TRIFURCA TION
studies that have illuminated flaws in both the decision making process of a
capital jury and capital punishment itself.
97
VII. The Rule Against Character Evidence is a Constitutional Right Under
the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
A. Overview
Although the Supreme Court has never squarely addressed the prohibition
against the introduction of character evidence, an exhaustive review reveals that
the rule enjoys deep-seated roots in Anglo-American jurisprudence.98 The
result is that a defendant's protection against the use of character evidence in a
criminal proceeding is not simply a creation of Congress, but is instead
mandated by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.99 Under this
conception of character evidence, the defendant enjoys a constitutional
protection that prohibits the prosecution from using his previous bad acts or
offenses as evidence that he committed the current offense. Before the
Supreme Court's opinion in Ring this fact was moot as applied to federal
capital cases. The guilt phase contained all of the elements of federal capital
murder. During this phase the defendant enjoyed the protection against the use
of character evidence provided by the Federal Rules of Evidence.'00 Now that
intent factors and statutory aggravating factors constitute elements of the crime
after Ring, part of the adjudication of the crime of federal capital murder spills
over into the sentencing phase. The defendant, therefore, has a constitutional
right not to have character evidence used against him during the adjudication of
these intent and statutory aggravating factors.
The problem is that the prosecution often introduces evidence of the
defendant's bad character during the sentencing phase.101 Before the jury
97. See infra Part X (offering trifurcation as a partial solution to defects in capital jury
decision making as revealed by empirical data).
98. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 75 n.5 (1991) (stating that "we express no
opinion on whether a state law would violate the Due Process Clause if it permitted the use of
'prior crimes' evidence to show propensity to commit a charged crime"). The prohibition
against character evidence is addressed in Part II of this Note.
99. See Drew D. Dropkin & James H. McComas, On a Collision Course: Pure
Propensity Evidence and Due Process in Alaska, 18 ALAsKA L. REv. 177, 190-91 (2001)
(incorporating the long common law history prohibiting the use of character evidence to support
an argument that both the federal and Alaska Due Process Clauses prohibit its use).
100. See FED. R. Ev. 404(a) (prohibiting the use of character evidence offered by the
prosecution to prove that the defendant "acted in conformity therewith").
101. See Bunin, supra note 4, at 270 (discussing the problems associated with the
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deliberates to determine whether the government has established the crucial
final elements of the crime-an intent factor and a statutory aggravating
factor-they are inundated with character evidence regarding the defendant. 1
02
Because the Constitution forbids character evidence, the sentencing phase is
now constitutionally deficient. Simultaneously, however, because the Supreme
Court has expressed the necessity of admitting as much information concerning
the defendant as possible in capital trials, simply excluding character evidence
from the sentencing phase altogether is not a viable option.'0 3 The only
solution that satisfies the defendant's right not to have character evidence used
against him, while also allowing the jury to hear as much information about the
defendant as possible, is to trifurcate the proceedings.
B. What is Character Evidence?
At its core, character evidence is "[e]vidence that a person has a particular
character trait generally... [used] to show that the person acted in conformity
with that trait at a particular time. '' °4 Federal Rule of Evidence 404(a)
explicitly forbids the admission of previous acts or character traits of a
defendant offered for this purpose.'05 It is important to distinguish, however,
between the prohibited and permissible uses of prior acts or character traits of a
defendant. 0 6 As a companion to Rule 404(a), Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b)
permits the introduction of character traits for "other purposes, such as proof of
motive, opportunity, [or] intent ... ',,07 Rule 404(b), however, is not an
exception to the prohibition against the illicit use of character traits. The
defendant's character traits may not be offered to prove action in conformity
intermingling of elements of the crime and sentencing factors).
102. See id. at 254 (noting that character evidence is regularly admitted during the
sentencing phase).
103. See supra note 59 (describing Supreme Court cases requiring that a capital jury
receive as much individualized information as possible when deciding whether to sentence a
defendant to death).
104. GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE 132 (Foundation Press 2002).
105. See FED. R. EviD. 404(a) (prohibiting the introduction of character evidence offered as
proof of conduct in conformity therewith). For purposes of this note, character evidence offered
to prove action in conformity therewith will also be described as "propensity reasoning."
106. Compare FED. R. EvID. 404(a) (prohibiting the introduction of a defendant's prior acts
offered to establish that the defendant acted in conformity therewith), with FED. R. EvID. 404(b)
(permitting the introduction of a defendant's prior acts for purposes other than establishing that
the defendant acted in conformity therewith).
107. See FED. R. EvID. 404(b) (permitting the use of prior acts offered to prove something
other than that defendant acted in conformity therewith on a particular occasion).
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therewith. This distinction is important because the Supreme Court has
specifically upheld the use of prior acts or character traits offered pursuant to
Rule 404(b).108 However, the Court has expressly left open the question of
whether the prohibition against the use of character evidence embodied in
404(a) is constitutionally required.109
C. Character Evidence and the Sentencing Phase of a Federal
Capital Trial
At the sentencing phase of a bifurcated federal capital trial, character
evidence is regularly admitted against the defendant in the form of nonstatutory
aggravating factors." 0 For example, the future dangerousness of the defendant
is one consideration the jury may take into account when considering the
appropriate punishment for the defendant."' Asserting that the defendant's
previous actions make him more likely to commit crimes in the future is the
purest form of character evidence. While future dangerousness is probative of
the appropriate punishment for a crime, its introduction during the same phase
of the trial that includes an adjudication of elements of the crime-the
existence of an intent factor and a statutory aggravating factor-raises
concerns. Justice Souter has identified this precise trepidation, which includes
"generalizing a defendant's earlier bad act into bad character and taking that as
raising the odds that he did the later bad act now charged (or, worse, as calling
108. See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 191-92 (1997) (upholding a state
statute that permitted the introduction of prior felonies offered to prove legal status rather than
that the defendant acted in conformity therewith); Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 556, 569
(1967) (upholding a Texas recidivist statute permitting the introduction of a prior offense for the
purpose of assessing punishment but not for "assessing the defendant's guilt or innocence under
the current indictment").
109. See Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 75 n.5 (1991) (stating that "we express no
opinion on whether a state law would violate the Due Process Clause if it permitted the use of
'prior crimes' evidence to show propensity to commit a charged crime").
110. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) (2000) (stating that at the sentencing hearing "[i]nformation
is admissible regardless of its admissibility under the rules governing the admission of evidence
at criminal trials"); United States v. Grande, 353 F. Supp. 2d 623, 635-36 (E.D. Va. 2005)
(permitting the introduction of evidence that the defendant "has engaged in a pattern of criminal
activity as an adult"); Bunin, supra note 4, at 254 (stating that "[p]ropensity and character
evidence are routinely used during a sentencing hearing").
11. See Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154, 162-64 (1994) (permitting the
introduction of evidence of future dangerousness); Grande, 353 F. Supp. 2d at 638 (allowing
the prosecution to introduce evidence that the defendant "poses a future danger based upon the
probability that he would commit criminal acts of violence that would constitute a continuing
threat to society").
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for preventive conviction even if he should happen to be innocent
momentarily)."" 12 Moreover, prosecutors enjoy relative ease in admitting this
type of evidence because testimony is not restricted to experts, such as
psychologists. Even a defendant's neighbor can offer character evidence."
13
Although admissible during the sentencing phase, character evidence is
unquestionably excluded during the guilt phase." 
4
D. Locating a Right Prohibiting the Use of Character Evidence in the Due
Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment
The Supreme Court has suggested that the Fifth Amendment forbids the
introduction of character evidence, although it has never addressed the issue
directly." 5 As a result of this dearth of case law, an in-depth analysis is
required to reveal the constitutional foundations of the rule against character
evidence. This analysis of whether the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment proscribes the introduction of character evidence turns on
"whether the introduction of this type of evidence is so extremely unfair that its
admission violates 'fundamental conceptions of justice. '" 116 As noted by the
Supreme Court, when attempting to determine whether the admission of such
evidence does in fact violate fundamental conceptions ofjustice, "[w]e begin,
as we do in all due-process cases, by examining our Nation's history, legal
traditions, and practices."'" 7  Analyzing character evidence through this
framework reveals that a rule proscribing its use is a fundamental right inherent
in the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
112. Old Chief, 519U.S. at 180-81.
113. See Bunin, supra note 4, at 254 (describing the different means by which character
evidence can enter the sentencing phase of the trial).
114. See FED. R. EVID. 404(a) (prohibiting the introduction of character evidence to prove
action in conformity therewith); Bunin, supra note 4, at 254 (describing the different means by
which character evidence can enter the sentencing phase of the trial).
115. See infra notes 138-43 and accompanying text (describing the Supreme Court cases
that suggest the introduction of character evidence would violate the Constitution).
116. Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 352 (1990) (quoting United States v.
Lovasco, 431 U.S. 783, 790 (1977)).
117. Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 710 (1997); see also Montana v. Egelhoff,
518 U.S. 37,43 (1996) ("Our primary guide in determining whether the principle in question is
fundamental is, of course, historical practice."); Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415,421
(1994) (stating that in determining whether state action violates Due Process, the Court must
look to the state's deviation from "established common-law procedures"); Burnham v. Superior
Court of California, 495 U.S. 604, 622 (1990) (stating that a "doctrine of personal jurisdiction
that dates back to the adoption of the Fourteenth Amendment and is still generally observed
unquestionably" satisfies the Due Process Clause).
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1. The Prohibition of Character Evidence Enjoys a Long Common Law
History
The prohibition against the use of character evidence enjoys a long
common law tradition because its use is so unfairly prejudicial.' 18 In fact, one
of the first opinions assailing the use of character evidence dates back to
Hampden's Trial in 1684.' 9 The court expressed its distaste for character
evidence as follows:
Mr. Williams. You know the case adjudged lately in this Court, a person
was indicted of forgery, we would not let them give evidence of any other
forgeries, but that for which he was indicted, because we would not suffer
any raking into men's course of life, to pick up evidence that they cannot be
prepared to answer to.
20
The next prominent example of the deep roots of the rule against character
evidence in Anglo-American jurisprudence occurs less than a decade later in
Harrison 's Trial.121 In this case the "Lord Chief Justice excluded evidence of a
118. See Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 448 n.1 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
(noting that the "common law has long deemed it unfair to argue that, because a person has
committed a crime in the past, he is more likely to have committed a similar, more recent
crime"); Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 475 (1948) ("Courts that follow the
common-law tradition almost unanimously have come to disallow resort by the prosecution to
any kind of evidence of a defendant's evil character to establish a probability of his guilt.");
McKinney v. Rees, 993 F.2d 1378, 1380 (9th Cir. 1993) ("The use of 'other acts' evidence as
character evidence is not only impermissible under the theory of evidence codified in the
California rules of evidence... and the Federal Rules of Evidence... but is contrary to firmly
established principles of Anglo-American jurisprudence."); see also Dropkin, supra note 99, at
190-91 (incorporating the long common law history prohibiting the use of character evidence to
support the argument that both the federal and Alaska Due Process Clauses prohibit its use);
Mark A. Sheft, Federal Rules of Evidence 413: A Dangerous New Frontier, 33 AM. CRIM. L.
REv. 57, 80 (1995) (noting that the rule against the use of character evidence has been a
"seminal part of American jurisprudence since the Nation's inception").
119. See Hampden's Trial, 9 How. St. Tr. 1054, 1124 (K.B. 1684) (finding Mr. Hampden
guilty of conspiring in an insurrection against the King of England). In Hampden 's Trial, Mr.
Hampden was indicted on charges, among others, that he "falsely, unlawfully, unjustly,
maliciously, and seditiously did consult, consent, conspire and confederate of an insurrection
within this kingdom of England.. . ." Id. at 1055. During the course of his trial, Mr. Williams,
the counsel for Mr. Hampden, sought to introduce evidence of a witness's reputation. Id at
1103. However, drawing support from a previous case, the Lord Chief Justice refused to permit
the evidence. Id.
120. Id. at 1103.
121. See Harrison's Trial, 12 How. St. Tr. 834, 871 (Old Bailey 1692) (finding Henry
Harrison guilty of murder). Henry Harrison was indicted for the murder of a local doctor. Id. at
834. Towards the end of the trial, the prosecution sought to admit testimony of a witness, Mr.
Bishop. Id. at 864. However, because Mr. Bishop's testimony pertained to acts that occurred
years before the murder and amounted to an attack on Henry Harrison's character, the Lord
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prior wrongful act of a defendant who was on trial for murder, saying to the
prosecution: 'Hold, what are you doing now? Are you going to arraign his
whole life? Away, away that ought not be; that is nothing to the matter. ""1
22
Approximately seventy years later, this common law prohibition had
crossed the Atlantic and had taken root in colonial America. In King v.
Doaks,123 a 1763 trial, the court refused to permit evidence offered by the
prosecution of the "defendant's prior acts of lasciviousness to bolster its
allegations that the defendant was operating a bawdy house."' 24 Later, in an
1807 prosecution for treason, a federal court refused to permit evidence of a
"treasonous military expedition in Kentucky"'125 intended to prove that the
defendant committed a treasonous act in Virginia. 126 The prohibition against
character evidence endured and was affirmed in an 1835 New York state case
involving counterfeit money. 27 In this instance, the court held it improper to
introduce evidence of a prior conviction. 28 Later, in 1865 Chief Justice
Cockbum made the following remarks concerning character evidence:
The truth is, this part of our law is an anomaly. Although, logically
speaking, it is quite clear that an antecedent bad character would form quite
as reasonable a ground for the presumption and probability of guilt as
previous good character lays the foundation of innocence, yet you cannot,
on the part of the prosecution, go into evidence as to bad character. 129
Finally, a case that sits temporally on the cusp between what is considered
common law tradition and what is considered modem Supreme Court practice,
is the 1890 Supreme Court case of Boyd v. United States.'30 In this case, the
Supreme Court stated that "[h]owever depraved in character, and however full
Chief Judge excluded the testimony. Id.
122. Dropkin, supra note 99, at 188 (quoting Harrison's Trial, 12 How. St. Tr. 834, 864
(Old Bailey 1692)).
123. See King v. Doaks, Quincy Mass. Reports 90,90-91 (Mass. Sup. Ct. 1763) (refusing
to admit character evidence).
124. Dropkin, supra note 99, at 189 (citing King v. Doaks, Quincy Mass. Reports 90,90-1
(Mass. Sup. Ct. 1763)).
125. Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422,449 n.1 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing
United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 187, 198 (No. 14,694) (CC Va. 1807) (Marshall, C.J.)).
126. See United States v. Burr, 25 Fed. Cas. 187, 198 (No. 14,694) (CC Va. 1807)
(Marshall, C.J.) (prohibiting the introduction of evidence offered for propensity reasoning).
127. See People v. White, 14 Wend. 111, 113-14 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1835) (prohibiting the
introduction of prior criminal acts).
128. Id.
129. Reg. v. Rowton, 10 Cox's Criminal Cases 25, 29-30 (Ct. Crim. App. 1865).
130. Boyd v. United States, 142 U.S. 450, 458 (1892) (noting that the defendant's prior
acts should have no bearing as to whether he committed the present offense).
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of crime their past lives may have been, the defendants were entitled to be tried
upon competent evidence, and only for the offence charged."''
These cases make clear that the prohibition against character evidence is a
deep-seated notion that owes its origins to the common law and has been firmly
incorporated into American jurisprudence.' 32 This long lineage alone lends
credence to the constitutional weight of the rule. But also impressive is the fact
that the prohibition against character evidence pre-dates by one hundred years
the constitutional requirement that a criminal defendant be found guilty beyond
a reasonable doubt. 33 This time difference is especially important considering
the emphasis the Supreme Court placed on history in locating the right to proof
beyond a reasonable doubt in the Due Process Clause. 34 Thus, given its long
common law history, the rule against character evidence is constitutionally
mandated by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.
2. Supreme Court Practice Recognizes the Importance of Preventing the
Introduction of Character Evidence
In every case that the Supreme Court has approved the introduction of
evidence pertaining to a character trait or a prior act of the defendant, the
prosecution sought to admit the disputed evidence for purposes other than to
establish that the defendant acted in conformity therewith. 135 This delicate
balance between admitting this type of evidence for a permissible purpose
under Rule 404(b) and admitting it for an impermissible purpose in
contravention of Rule 404(a) has fueled controversy.136 Yet, it is through this
131. Id.at458.
132. See Sheft, supra note 118, at 80 (noting that the ban against the use of character
evidence is a "seminal part of American Jurisprudence").
133. See In Re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) ("[W]e explicitly hold that the Due
Process Clause protects the accused against conviction except upon proof beyond a reasonable
doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime with which he is charged."). In holding
that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is a constitutional requirement of criminal prosecution, the
Court noted that the "demand for a higher degree of persuasion in criminal cases was recurrently
expressed from ancient times, [though] its crystallization into the formula 'beyond a reasonable
doubt' seems to have occurred as late as 1798." Id. at 361; see also Dropkin, supra note 99, at
188 ("Moreover, the prohibition against the admission of pure propensity evidence antedates the
beyond a reasonable doubt standard by more than a century.").
134. See In Re Winship, 397 U.S. at 373-75 (Harlan, J., concurring) (noting the very long
history of the requirement of proof beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal adjudications).
135. See, e.g., Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 69 (1991) (permitting the introduction of
prior act evidence for the purpose of establishing intent).
136. See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 484-85 (1948) (noting that the
confusion between permissible and impermissible uses of evidence pertaining to character traits
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controversy that the Supreme Court has consistently illuminated its practice of
banning the introduction of character evidence. 1
37
In Michelson v. United States,'38 the Supreme Court expressed in dicta
that "[t]he state may not show defendant's prior trouble with the law, specific
criminal acts, or ill name among neighbors, even though such facts might
logically be persuasive that he is by propensity a probable perpetrator of the
crime."139 The most profound and instructive statement concerning character
evidence, however, is contained in Spencer v. Texas.140 Chief Justice Warren
announced the following:
Whether or not a State has recidivist statutes on its books, it is well
established that evidence of prior convictions may not be used by the State
to show that the accused has a criminal disposition and that the probability
that he committed the crime currently charged is increased. While the
Court has never held that the use of prior convictions to show nothing more
than a disposition to commit crime would violate the Due Process Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment, our decision exercising supervisory power over
criminal trials in federal courts, as well as decisions by courts of appeals
"are such that even lawyers and judges, after study and reflection, often are confused"). This
confusion resulted in one of the seminal Supreme Court opinions concerning the use of
character evidence. See infra note 138 (providing a detailed discussion of the Court's opinion).
137. See infra notes 138-43 and accompanying text (describing the Supreme Court's
practice of prohibiting the introduction of character evidence).
138. See Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469,486-87 (1948) (upholding the use the
defendant's prior acts as a means of testing the level of knowledge a character witness has
concerning the defendant's reputation). "Michelson was convicted of bribing a federal revenue
agent." Id. at 470. To question how well a character witness actually knew Michelson's
reputation, the prosecutor inquired into a previous conviction ofMichelson. Id. at 472. Despite
the trial judge's admonition to the jury that Michelson's prior conviction was being offered only
to test the knowledge of the character witness, and not to prove Michelson had in fact
committed the prior crime, Michelson protested the introduction of his prior acts. Id. at 473.
Carefully noting that the introduction of Michelson's prior crime was not character evidence,
but was instead offered to test how well the character witness knew Michelson's reputation, the
Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's approval of this type of evidence. Id. at 486-87.
139. See id. at 487 (upholding the introduction of the defendant's prior acts as a means for
testing the level of knowledge a character witness has concerning the defendant's reputation).
140. See Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554, 569 (1967) (upholding a Texas statute that
permitted a defendant's sentence to be enhanced upon a showing of prior convictions).
"[Spencer] was indicted for murder, with malice, of his common-law wife." Id. at 557. Because
Spencer had previously been convicted of murder, the jury was instructed that a Texas statute
permitted the jury to consider death as a possible punishment upon finding Spencer guilty of the
current offense. Id. at 557-58. "Thejury was instructed as well that it should not consider the
prior conviction as any evidence of the defendant's guilt on the charge on which he was being
tried." Id. Spencer was convicted and sentenced to death. 1d. at 558. Spencer contested the
introduction of his prior conviction. Id. at 557-58. In affirming Spencer's death sentence, the
Supreme Court relied on both the judge's ability to prevent prejudice and the "[t]olerance for a
spectrum of state procedures dealing with a common problem of law enforcement." Id. at 566.
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and state courts, suggest that evidence of prior crimes introduced for no




Finally, as recently as 1997, the Supreme Court has expressed in dicta that
character evidence is impermissible.142 The Court noted that it would be
improper for the jury to generalize "a defendant's earlier bad act into bad
character and taking that as raising the odds that he did the later bad act now
charged... .043
3. Every Jurisdiction Has Enacted Evidentiary Rules Prohibiting the Use of
Character Evidence
The Supreme Court has also looked to state practice for guidance in
locating a fundamental Due Process right. 44 While perhaps not sufficient alone
to establish a fundamental right, the greater number of states that recognize a
right the stronger the argument that the right is embodied in the Due Process
Clause.1 45 Turning to the prohibition of character evidence, the Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit noted that "[t]he rule against using character
evidence to show behavior in conformance therewith.., is now established not
only in the California and federal evidence rules, but in the evidence rules of
thirty-seven other states and in the common-law precedents of the remaining
twelve states and the District of Columbia."'146 That every jurisdiction has
141. See id. at 569 (upholding a Texas statute that permitted a defendant's sentence to be
enhanced upon a finding of prior convictions).
142. See Old Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180 (1997) (noting the Court's
disapproval of character evidence).
143. Id.
144. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 570-71 (2003) (drawing on the actions of a
majority of the states to support the finding of a Due Process right); Washington v. Glucksberg,
521 U.S. 702, 716-17 (1997) (emphasizing the fact that almost every state prohibits physician
assisted suicide in finding that there exists no Due Process right to physician assisted suicide).
145. See Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573 (noting the number of states that had repealed their
sodomy laws since the Supreme Court had last visited the issue).
146. McKinney v. Rees, 993 F.2d 1378, 1381 (9th Cir. 1993). In this case the Ninth
Circuit noted that the following states have enacted evidentiary rules prohibiting the use of
character evidence: "ALASKA EvD. CODE § 404; ARiz. R. EVID. 404; ARK. R. EVID. 404; CAL.
EVID. CODE § 1101; COLO. R. EVID. 404; DEL. R. EVID. 404; FLA. STAT. ch. 90.404; HAW. R.
EvD. 404; IDAHO R. EVID. 404; IOWA R. EVID. 404; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-447; Ky. R. EVID.
404; LA. CODE EVID. ANN. art. 404; ME. R. EviD. 404; MICH. R. EVID. 404; MINN. R. EviD. 404;
Miss. R. EVID. 404; MONT. R. EVID. 404; NEB. REV. STAT. § 27-404 (Reissue 1989); NEv. REv.
STAT. § 48.045 (1986); N.H. R. EVID. 404; N.J. R. EvID. 47; N.M. STAT. ANN. § 11-404 (Michie
1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8c-1, Rule 404 (1988 & Cumm. Supp. 1990); N.D. R. EvtD. 404;
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established rules prohibiting the use of character evidence is strong evidence of
our "Nation's history, legal traditions, and practices" and supports a Due
Process right prohibiting the introduction of such evidence in criminal
prosecutions.
47
4. Exceptions to the Rule: Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414
One particular exception to the rule against character evidence is found in
Rules 413 and 414 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 48 In cases involving
sexual abuse or child molestation, these two Rules permit the prosecution to
introduce "evidence of the defendant's commission of another offense or
offenses" of sexual assault or child molestation for the purpose of establishing
that the defendant committed the current offense. 149 Analysis of these two
exceptions is important. At first glance these two Rules appear to undercut the
argument that the ban against character evidence is required by the Due Process
Clause. Upon further inspection, however, it becomes clear that these Rules do
not undermine this Note's primary argument. In fact, these exceptions support
it.
OHIO R. EVID. 404; OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 2404 (1991); OR. R. EVID. 404; R.I. R. EvID. 404;
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 19-12-5 (1992); TENN. R. EvID. 404; TEX. R. CRIM. EVID. 404;
UTAH R. EviD. 404; VT. R. EviD. 404; WASH. R. EviD. 404; W. VA. R. EVID. 404; Wis. R. EVID.
904.03; Wvo. R. EVID. 404." Id. The twelve states remaining and the District of Columbia
have adopted the prohibition against character evidence through case law. Id. These decisions
include: Artis v. United States, 505 A.2d 52, 56 (D.C. App. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 964
(1986); Anonymous v. State, 507 So. 2d 972, 973-74 (Ala. 1987); State v. Holliday, 268 A.2d
368, 369 (Conn. 1970); Brown v. State, 398 S.E.2d 34, 34 (Ga. Ct. App. 1990); People v.
Kannapes, 567 N.E.2d 377, 379-80 (I11. App. Ct. 1990); Penley v. State, 506 N.E.2d 806, 808
(Ind. 1987); Ross v. State, 350 A.2d 680, 684 (Md. 1976); Commonwealth v. Chalifoux, 291
N.E.2d 635, 638 (Mass. 1973); State v. Clark, 801 S.W.2d 701, 703 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990);
People v. Powell, 543 N.Y.S.2d 818, 819 (1989); Commonwealth v. Lark, 543 A.2d 491, 497
(Pa. 1988); State v. Griffin, 285 S.E.2d 631, 633-34 (S.C. 1981); Brooks v. Commonwealth,
258 S.E.2d 504, 506 (Va. 1979). Id.
147. Washington, 521 U.S. at 710.
148. See FisHER, supra note 104, at 182 (noting that Rules 412 and 413 are true exceptions
to the rule against character evidence).
149. See FED. R. EviD. 413 ("In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of an
offense of sexual assault, evidence of the defendant's commission of another offense or offenses
of sexual assault is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter to which it
is relevant."); FED. R. EVID. 414 ("In a criminal case in which the defendant is accused of an
offense of child molestation, evidence of the defendant's commission of another offense or
offenses of child molestation is admissible, and may be considered for its bearing on any matter
to which it is relevant.").
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First, unlike the long common law heritage that the ban against the
"traditional use" 150 of character evidence enjoys, the common law did not
regularly prohibit these specific uses of character evidence.' 5' Not only does
the prohibition of this type of evidence lack common law roots, but the recent
practice of many states has also permitted these two exceptions.152 Second,
even lacking common law roots, these two exceptions have faced vigorous
opposition. Indeed, Congress failed to heed the Judicial Conference's strong
recommendation that these two exceptions be, at the very least, redrafted.
5 3
The Conference noted that the "overwhelming majority ofjudges, lawyers, law
professors, and legal organizations.., opposed new Evidence Rules 413 ...
[and] 414." 154 Moreover there was "highly unusual unanimity of the members
of the Standing and Advisory Committees" that these Rules should be
reconsidered.' 55 But the strong opposition to these two Rules did not stop with
the Judicial Conference. In fact, one Judge, in a dissenting opinion, argued that
the Eighth Circuit should rehear a case en banc to determine whether Rule 413
violates Due Process.156 The fact that this subset of character evidence, which
lacks the same long history and universal disapproval as traditional character
evidence, still raises Due Process concerns underscores how completely the
traditional prohibition of character evidence is ingrained in American
jurisprudence.
150. Note that "traditional" use of character evidence means any character evidence other
than prior acts of sexual assault or child molestation offered in a prosecution concerning such
offenses.
151. United States v. Castillo, 140 F.3d 874, 881 (10th Cir. 1998) (noting that unlike the
general ban against character evidence, "the historical record regarding evidence of one's sexual
character is much more ambiguous").
152. See FISHER, supra note 104, at 186 (noting that many states have liberalized admission
of prior sexual crimes evidence in sex crimes); see also Castillo, 140 F.3d at 881 ("More than a
century ago, courts regularly admitted a defendant's prior acts as proof of the crime of incest.");
Lannan v. State, 600 N.E.2d 1334, 1335 (Ind. 1992) (overturning Indiana's long settled
exception permitting, "in prosecutions for incest, sodomy, criminal deviate conduct or child
molesting, evidence of certain kinds of prior sexual conduct").
153. See REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED STATES, THE ADMISSION OF
CHARACTER EVIDENCE IN CERTAIN SEXUAL MISCONDUCT CASES (Submitted to Congress Feb. 9,
1995) (strongly opposing Federal Rules of Evidence 413 and 414).
154. Id.
155. Id.
156. See United States v. Mound, 157 F.3d 1153, 1153-54 (8th Cir. 1998) (Arnold, J.,
dissenting) (urging a rehearing en banc to consider the Due Process implications of Rule 413).
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E. Implications for the Federal Capital Trial
The Due Process right prohibiting the introduction of character evidence
renders the bifurcated proceedings of a federal capital trial constitutionally
deficient. As discussed above, intent factors and statutory aggravating
factors-elements of the crime-are adjudicated in a proceeding awash with
character evidence. 57 Prohibiting the introduction of character evidence is not
a viable solution as it would simply trade one constitutional deficiency for
another. While the Constitution prohibits the introduction of character
evidence during the adjudication of guilt or innocence, it also requires the
capital trial to include as much individualized information as possible about the
defendant. 58  Banning character evidence would greatly reduce this
particularized and individualized examination. 5 9
Trifurcation respects both of these constitutional requirements. First, the
adjudication of intent factors and statutory aggravating factors, the final
elements of federal capital murder, occurs during the eligibility phase. 60 This
phase occurs after the guilt phase but before the sentencing phase.' 6' The
defendant enjoys the protection of the Federal Rules of Evidence during this
phase. Assuming the prosecution has established both an intent factor and a
statutory aggravating factor, the elements of federal capital murder have been
satisfied. The defendant is death eligible. Thus, the trial proceeds to the
sentencing phase.' 62 Under a trifurcated structure, the sentencing phase does
not include elements of the crime. The prosecution can therefore admit
evidence necessary for the jury to make a particularized and individualized
assessment of the defendant without impinging upon the defendant's Due
Process right prohibiting the introduction of character evidence. 63 Trifurcation
157. See Bunin, supra note 4, at 254 ("It is as difficult to imagine a sentencing hearing
without propensity and character evidence as it is to conceive of a trial where a defendant is
alleged to be guilty based solely on unrelated past conduct or the quality of his character.").
158. See supra note 59 (discussing the requirement that a capital jury receive as much
information about the defendant as possible).
159. This results from the fact that character evidence is "routinely" admitted during the
sentencing hearing. See Bunin, supra note 4, at 254 (noting that character evidence is often
admitted during sentencing hearings).
160. See supra Part V (describing the contents of the eligibility phase under a trifurcated
trial structure).
161. See supra Part V (describing the structure of a trifurcated trial).
162. See supra Part V (describing the progression of a trifurcated capital trial).
163. See supra note 59 (discussing the constitutional importance of a capital jury receiving
as much particularized and individualized information about the defendant as possible); supra
Part VII (arguing that a criminal defendant enjoys a constitutional protection against the
introduction of character evidence).
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is the only available procedural solution that satisfies both of these
constitutional requirements.
VIII. The Unique Instance Arising After the Supreme Court's Opinion in
Crawford v. Washington
A. Overview
Crawford v. Washington 64 marked a shift in the Supreme Court's Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence.165 Under this new analysis of the Confrontation
Clause, judges no longer retain discretion in determining whether to admit
certain testimonial hearsay evidence. 166  Assuming that the Confrontation
Clause does indeed apply to the capital sentencing phase, the absolute bar of
the Confrontation Clause now trumps the FDPA's balancing test for
determining whether to admit certain evidence. 67 While excluding certain
evidence satisfies Confrontation Clause concerns, it simultaneously cuts against
the Eighth Amendment requirement that a court admit as much individualized
164. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36,68 (2004) (holding that statements made by an
unavailable witness to police violated the Confrontation Clause when introduced against the
defendant at trial).
165. The issue in Crawford turned on whether the prosecution's introduction of a tape-
recorded statement by the wife of the accused violated the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment. Id. at 42. "Petitioner Michael Crawford stabbed a man who allegedly tried to rape
his wife. .. ." Id. at 38. At his trial, the prosecution introduced his wife's testimony in the form
of a tape recording. Id. at 61. Because of marital privilege the Petitioner's wife was unavailable
for cross-examination concerning the statement. Id. at 40. The trial court admitted the hearsay
statement pursuant to Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980), finding that it did not violate the
Confrontation Clause because it bore a "'particularized guarantee of trustworthiness."' Id. The
Supreme Court, however, rejected the rationale of Roberts. Id. at 60. Instead, the Court held
that "[w]here testimonial statements are involved, we do not think the Framers meant to leave
the Sixth Amendment's protection to the vagaries of the rules of evidence, much less to
amorphous notions of reliability." 1d. at 61. Because the testimony at issue in this case was
"testimonial" and the accused did not have an opportunity to cross-examine the witness
concerning the statement, the Supreme Court held its introduction violated the Sixth
Amendment. Id. at 68.
166. See id. at 61 ("Admitting statements deemed reliable by a judge is fundamentally at
odds with the right of confrontation."). For an in-depth discussion as to what constitutes
"testimonial" hearsay evidence, see generally Major Robert Wm. Best, To Be or Not to Be
Testimonial? That is the Question: 2004 Developments in the Sixth Amendment, 2005 ARMY
LAW. 65 (2005).
167. See United States v. Jordan, 357 F. Supp. 2d 889, 902 (E.D. Va. 2005) (noting that
the Constitution trumps the FDPA); see also United States v. Bodkins, No. 04CR70083, 2005
U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8747, at *13-14 (W.D. Va. May 11, 2005) (finding that Crawford requires
trifurcated proceedings).
64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 349 (2007)
evidence as possible during the sentencing phase of a capital trial. 168  A
trifurcated structure is the only procedure that ameliorates both of these
constitutional concerns.
B. Federal Capital Trials Post-Crawford
The court in United States v. Jordan directly addressed the issue raised by
Crawford in the context of the federal capital trial. 169  In this case the
government sought to introduce hearsay testimony of a deceased witness.
170
After finding that the Confrontation Clause barred the deceased witness's
statements during the guilt phase, the court went forward to consider
Crawford's implications for the sentencing phase of the trial.171 It noted that
"[t]he task before this Court is to define the interplay between... [the FDPA]
and the scope of the Confrontation Clause as enunciated in Crawford.'"72 In
addressing this issue, the court found itself in a conundrum. On the one hand,
it noted the constitutional restraints placed on the admission of hearsay
evidence after Crawford.173 On the other hand, the court observed that the
"Supreme Court has also urged trial courts to admit more evidence, not less, on
the presence or absence of aggravating and mitigating factors.'
74
Faced with a tug-of-war between competing constitutional objectives, the
court responded by trifuarcating the proceedings.1 75 In doing so, the court began
by first dividing the sentencing phase into its "two facets: eligibility and
selection.' 76 Because the eligibility phase involves the adjudication of the
"functional equivalent of elements of the capital offense," the court found that
168. See supra note 59 (describing the requirement that the jury should have as much
individualized information as possible about a capital defendant).
169. See Jordan, 357 F. Supp. 2d at 898 (addressing the implications of Crawford in the
context of the federal capital trial).
170. See id. at 898 (describing the hearsay statements sought to be admitted by the
government).
171. See id. at 901 ("Having concluded that the Confrontation Clause bars the admissibility
of Brown's statements to the... [police] absent cross-examination in guilt phase, the Court will
now turn to the permissible use of such a statement during the penalty phase of the trial.").
172. Id.
173. See id. ("The Supreme Court has consistently counseled that the Constitution places
special constraints on the procedures used to convict an accused of a capital offense and
sentence him to death.").
174. United States v. Jordan, 357 F. Supp. 2d 889, 901 (E.D. Va. 2005).
175. See id. at. 903 (noting that trifurcating the trial is appropriate "under the facts of this
case").
176. Id. at 902.
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the constitutional safeguard of the Confrontation Clause applied.' 17 Applying
the Confrontation Clause to the final elements needed to establish federal
capital murder-intent factors and statutory aggravating factors-satisfied the
Sixth Amendment. Next, to provide the "individualized treatment" 178 required
by the Eighth Amendment, the court held that the Confrontation Clause and the
Federal Rules of Evidence do not apply if the trial progresses to the selection
phase. 179 Therefore, trifurcation provided a solution to both the Sixth and
Eighth Amendment concerns that arise during the federal capital trial.
C. Crawford's Impact on Trifurcation
While Crawford is important because it illustrates the unique case in
which the Confrontation Clause requires trifurcation, it is important to realize
the limits of this analysis. The Confrontation Clause will rarely be an issue
during the sentencing phase. Crawford's application to trifurcation, therefore,
may be attenuated. More illuminating and perhaps more important, however, is
that the application of Crawford to the federal capital trial reveals that trial
courts are amenable to trifurcation. These courts have implicitly found that
trifurcation is not prohibited by the FDPA.180 Viewed in this sense, Crawford's
greatest value lies in the fact that it reinforces the notion that trifurcation is a
viable alternative to the current bifurcated structure of federal capital trials.
IX Statutory Construction of the FDPA Compels Trifurcation
During the sentencing phase of the trial, the judge continues to screen the
admission of evidence in his traditional capacity as gatekeeper. 181 The toolwith which the judge screens evidence, however, is not the Federal Rules of
177. Id.
178. See Stringer v. Black, 503 U.S. 222,230 (1992) (noting the "well-established Eighth
Amendment requirement of individualized sentencing determinations in death penalty cases").
179. See United States v. Jordan, 357 F. Supp. 2d 889, 904 (E.D. Va. 2005) (noting that
the court will admit evidence "[w]ithout the Crawford limitations" and that evidence will be
admitted according to the balancing test prescribed by the FDPA).
180. Compare Bunin, supra note 4, at 274 (stating that trifurcation "requires rewriting the
FDPA"), with United States v. Jordan, 357 F. Supp. 2d 889, 903 ("A close examination of the
governing statute... reveals that the statute does not necessarily mandate a single unitary
proceeding.").
181. See United States v. Johnson, 362 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1105 (N.D. Iowa) (noting that
"the court retains at least part of its gatekeeper function" during the capital sentencing phase of
the trial).
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Evidence. 82 The judge must limit evidence according to the FDPA. The
FDPA states that "[i]nformation is admissible regardless of its admissibility
under the rules governing admission of evidence at criminal trials except that
information may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the danger
of creating unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury.' 83
For analytical purposes, this requirement is a slightly less stringent version of
the balancing test embodied in Federal Rules of Evidence 403.184 Applied to
the sentencing phase, the test described in the FDPA tilts strongly in favor of
excluding the admission of intent factors, statutory aggravating factors, and
nonstatutory aggravating factors in a single proceeding. Excluding any factor
completely from the trial is not a viable option.' 85 The optimal solution, which
reduces the risks associated with a unitary proceeding while also complying
with the FDPA, is trifurcation.'
8 6
This Note is firm in its belief that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth
Amendment protects a defendant from the introduction of character
evidence. 187 This Note also acknowledges the sweeping implications that such
a right would have for all criminal trials. As a result, judges might be hesitant
to recognize the constitutional stature of the rule against character evidence.
Therefore, while a statutory construction argument based on the FDPA does not
carry the force of the Constitution, its narrow focus might also be its savior.
Avoiding a constitutional issue, the argument that statutory construction of the
FDPA compels trifurcation may be more successful.
182. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) (2000) ("Information is admissible regardless of its
admissibility under the rules governing admission of evidence at criminal trials ....
183. Id.
184. See FED. R. EviD. 403 (permitting a court to exclude evidence "if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury"); see also Johnson, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 1105 (noting that the limitation in
the FDPA "appears to be analogous to" Federal Rules of Evidence 403). But see Johnson, 362
F. Supp. 2d at 1105 (suggesting that the FDPA's test is less stringent than Federal Rules of
Evidence 403).
185. See supra Part II (describing the requirements of the FDPA). Prohibiting the
introduction of either statutory or nonstatutory aggravating factors is in direct conflict with the
text of the FDPA.
186. See supra Part II (describing the decision making process of the capital jury during the
sentencing phase).
187. See supra Part VII (describing the character evidence argument).
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A. United States v. Johnson'
88
Judge Bennett's decision to trifurcate the proceedings of the federal capital
murder trial of Angela Johnson provides the best example of this statutory
argument.'89 As the gatekeeper, the judge may exclude evidence "if its
probative value is outweighed by the danger of creating unfair prejudice,
confusing the issues, or misleading the jury."' 90 The question becomes,
therefore, whether the probative value of evidence of nonstatutory aggravating
factors is outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or
misleading the jury.'9'
The first step in the analysis is to consider the meaning of "probative" in
the context of the FDPA. As Judge Bennett stated in Johnson:
[T]here is no reason to suppose that probative value within the meaning of
the... [FDPA] means anything different than probative value within the
meaning of Rule 403 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. Probative value
within the meaning of Rule 403, in turn, is essentially the relevance of the
evidence.'
92
Accordingly, in order for evidence to be relevant it must have "any
tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination of the action more probable or less probable than it would be
without the evidence."' 93 Whether the introduction of evidence of nonstatutory
aggravating factors has "any tendency" to establish the existence of a statutory
aggravating factor is at the core of the statutory construction argument for
trifurcation.' 94 In Johnson, Judge Bennett found that the nonstatutory
aggravating factors likely to be introduced by the prosecution were not
probative to the jury's determination of the existence of intent factors or
statutory aggravating factors. 195 Indeed evidence of nonstatutory aggravating
factors is never probative of the existence of intent factors or statutory
188. United States v. Johnson, 362 F. Supp. 2d 1043 (N.D. Iowa 2005).
189. See id. at 1103-11 (discussing the statutory justification for trifurcating the trial).
190. 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) (2000); see Johnson, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 1105 (discussing the
judge's role as gatekeeper during the sentencing phase of the trial).
191. See Johnson, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 1104-10 (engaging in an analysis of whether the
probative value of victim impact statements is outweighed by the risks of unfair prejudice,
confusion of the issues, and misleading the jury).
192. Id. at 1105.
193. FED. R. EVID. 401.
194. Id.
195. See United States v. Johnson, 362 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1099 (N.D. Iowa 2005)
(describing the two-part determination that the jury must make during the sentencing phase of a
federal capital murder trial).
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aggravating factors. The jury is required to make two separate and independent
determinations: whether the defendant is eligible for the death penalty, and if
so, whether death is the appropriate punishment. 96 Because the FDPA requires
the jury to make these determinations independent of one anther, 97 evidence of
nonstatutory aggravating factors can never be probative of intent factors or
statutory aggravating factors. 98
As a result, the probative value of nonstatutory aggravating factors can be
assigned a value of zero. 199 Even the slightest risk of unfair prejudice,
misleading the jury, or confusing the issues justifies excluding nonstatutory
aggravating factors. As Judge Bennett notes, however, the risk of unfair
prejudice during the sentencing phase can be enormous.200 For instance, Judge
Bennett made the following remarks concerning the power of victim impact
statements in the companion murder trial of Dustin Honken:
I have already presided over the penalty phase in the companion case
against Dustin Honken. This case will likely involve victim impact
evidence that is substantially similar to the victim impact evidence in
Honken's case, because this case involves the same alleged murders of the
same victims. I can say, without hesitation, that the victim impact
testimony presented in Honken's trial was the most forceful, emotionally
powerful, and emotionally draining evidence that I have heard in any kind
of proceeding in any case, civil or criminal, in my entire career as a
practicing trial attorney and federal judge spanning nearly 30 years.
20'
From this statement, the potential for evidence of a nonstatutory
aggravating factor to result in unfair prejudice is clear.202 To be sure, not only
196. See id. at 1106 ("The Supreme Court itself has 'distinguished between two different
aspects of the capital sentencing process, the eligibility phase and the selection phase."') (citing
Buchanan v. Angelone, 522 U.S. 269, 273 (1998)).
197. See 18 U.S.C. § 3592(c) (2000) (providing an exhaustive list of statutory aggravating
factors). Combined with § 3593(e)(2), which requires the jury to find a statutory aggravating
factor listed in § 3592(c) before imposing the death penalty, it is clear that nonstatutory
aggravating factors are to have no influence on the jury's determination of statutory aggravating
factors.
198. See Johnson, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 1107 ("To pretend that... [victim impact statements
are] not potentially unfairly prejudicial on issues to which it has little or no probative value is
simply not realistic.").
199. See id. ("[S]uch potent, emotional evidence is a quintessential example of information
likely to cause a jury to make a determination on an unrelated issue on the improper basis of
inflamed emotion and bias. .. ").
200. See id. at 1106-07 (describing the power of victim impact statements).
201. Id.
202. See id. at 1107-09 (citing literature discussing the incredible impact of victim impact
statements on the capital jury).
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can victim impact statements result in unfair prejudice, but evidence of any
nonstatutory aggravating factor can also produce this result.
20 3
Again consider the example at the beginning of this Note.2 °4 In an effort
to establish the nonstatutory aggravating factor of future dangerousness, 2 5 the
prosecution flooded the jury with the defendant's entire criminal record.206 The
introduction of this evidence creates the risk that the jury may find the statutory
aggravating factor of pecuniary gain based on evidence of the nonstatutory
aggravating factor of future dangerousness. 20 7 Under the FDPA, the judge must
exclude the simultaneous introduction of evidence of intent and statutory
aggravating factors and nonstatutory aggravating factors to prevent this unfair
prejudice.
The potential for evidence to cause the jury to confuse issues is also
grounds for the judge to exclude evidence pursuant to the FDPA. 20' Having
already established that the probative value of evidence of nonstatutory
aggravating factors is virtually non-existent, any risk that the jury will confuse
the issues tilts the balance enough to justify the exclusion of such evidence. In
Johnson, Judge Bennett stated that the "[i]ntroduction of extraneous
203. Adjectives are important to understanding what constitutes unfairly prejudicial
evidence. Strickler v. Greene, 527 U.S. 263, 289 (1999) ("[T]he adjective is important. The
question is not whether the defendant would more likely than not have received a different
verdict with the evidence, but whether in its absence he received a fair trial .. . ."). The key to
understanding what constitutes "unfair prejudice" is that the prejudice must be unfair.
Obviously, the prosecution's goal is to present evidence that is prejudicial to the defendant.
Rule 403 prohibits evidence, therefore, only when it is unfairly prejudicial. FED. R. EVID. 403
("[E]vidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice .... ."). The Supreme Court has noted that evidence is unfairly prejudicial when
it may prompt a jury to base a decision on an improper basis. United States v. Old Chief, 519
U.S. 172, 180 (1997). In the context of the FDPA, basing a finding of an intent factor or a
statutory aggravating factor on evidence of a nonstatutory aggravating factor is an improper
basis.
204. See supra Part I (providing a hypothetical example of the sentencing phase of a
bifurcated federal capital murder trial).
205. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) (2000) ("At the sentencing hearing, information may be
presented as to any matter relevant to the sentence .... ").
206. See United States v. Matthews, 246 F. Supp. 2d 137, 149 (N.D.N.Y. 2002)
(permitting the introduction of prior unadjudicated criminal actions as nonstatutory aggravating
factors).
207. See supra Part I (providing a hypothetical example of the evidence introduced during
the sentencing phase of a federal capital murder trial).
208. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(c) (2000) ("Information is admissible regardless of its
admissibility under the rules governing admission of evidence at criminal trials except that
information may be excluded if its probative value is outweighed by the danger of creating
unfair prejudice, confusing the issues, or misleading the jury.").
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information into the jury's determination of... statutory aggravating factors
could.., only tend to confuse the issues. 
2 9
Finally, the judge may also exclude evidence if its probative value is
outweighed by the risk that the evidence will "mislead thejury." Judge Bennett
succinctly summarized this risk:
If the jury is permitted to hear information on all of the factors in one
proceeding, the jury is reasonably likely to be misled into believing that all
information is pertinent to the determination of all factors and the balance
of factors, when the process under... [the FDPA] is actually sequential
and cumulative: The jury must first find the defendant guilty; then must
find at least one ... statutory aggravating factor; then may find one or more
non-statutory aggravating factors and one or more mitigating factors; then
must balance all of the factors to determine the appropriate penalty.210
Because the FDPA instructs judges to exclude evidence that may mislead
the jury, and because the probative value of nonstatutory aggravating factors
will always be outweighed by the risk of misleading the jury, the FDPA can
only be read as allowing, and perhaps even requiring, trifurcation.
B. The Implications of Statutory Construction for Trifurcation
From the analysis above, the simultaneous presentation of evidence of
intent factors, statutory aggravating factors, and nonstatutory aggravating
factors creates a sufficient risk to justify the exclusion of nonstatutory
aggravating factors. When combined with the fact that the FDPA and the
Constitution mandate the introduction of nonstatutory aggravating factors,211
statutory construction justifies trifurcation. However, this justification is
simply a reason or a rationale to support a trial judge's decision to trifurcate the
proceedings.21 2 It does not carry with it the mandatory implications of the
constitutional character argument. But the statutory argument's simplicity
makes it powerful nonetheless. Moreover, because the statutory argument
avoids a constitutional challenge to the FDPA and has direct support in case
law, it is perhaps more likely to be successful.
209. United States v. Johnson, 362 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1109 (N.D. Iowa 2005).
210. Id.
211. See supra note 59 (discussing the importance of introducing as much evidence as
possible in capital trials).
212. See Johnson, 362 F. Supp. 2d at 1104 (noting that the FDPA provides "[o]ther
grounds for 'trifurcation"').
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X Trifurcation Ameliorates Problems Associated with Capital Jury
Decision Making
The Constitution requires jurors to make a "reasoned moral judgment"
when deciding whether the defendant should live or die.213 Jurors unable to
"meet the constitutionally mandated standards of impartiality in capital
sentencing... must not serve as capital jurors., 2t 4 Despite this constitutional
requirement, empirical research demonstrates that many jurors have already
decided the defendant's fate long before the trial progresses to the sentencing
phase.21 5  Trifurcating the proceedings, while surely not able to cure this
fundamental failing of the capital trial, can hopefully relieve some of the
symptoms.
A. Empirical Research: The Capital Jury Project
A recent study analyzed the decision making process of 916 jurors serving on
state capital murder trials.216 The results revealed that almost half of these capital
jurors had decided the defendant's punishment before the trial entered the
sentencing phase.211 Moreover, the study also exposed that this preliminary
punishment decision was not tenuous.218 "Most jurors who said they took a stand
for either life or death during the guilt stage of the trial told us that they were
'absolutely convinced' oftheir stand at that early point. '2 9 These jurors' tenacious
and steadfast adherence to their initial decision continued throughout the
proceedings to the actual entry of a life or death verdict.
220
For trifurcation to alleviate this problem, the jurors' pre-sentencing punishment
decisions must be made sometime after the trial commences. Trifurcation cannot
213. Bowers, supra note 82, at 1483.
214. Id. at 1486.
215. See id. at 1477 ("Interviews with 916 capital jurors in eleven states reveal, however,
that many jurors reached a personal decision concerning punishment before the sentencing stage
of the trial, before hearing the evidence or arguments concerning the appropriate punishment,
and before the judge's instructions for making the sentencing decision.").
216. See id. (noting that the study interviewed "916 jurors in eleven states").
217. Every state has adopted procedures similar to the federal capital trial. The
proceedings are divided into a guilt phase and a sentencing phase. This research, therefore, is
applicable to analysis of the federal capital trial.
218. See Bowers, supra note 82, at 1477 (noting that most jurors who decide upon the
defendant's fate before the sentencing phase are "absolutely convinced" of their decision).
219. Id. at 1489.
220. See id. at 1491 ("Most conspicuously, jurors who take early pro-death and early pro-
life stands tend to hold their initial stands for the rest of the decision-making process.").
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assuage the problem ifjurors enter the trial already knowing whether they are going
to sentence the defendant to life or death. Most jurors who formed premature
punishment opinions, however, indicated that their decisions coalesced during the
presentation of guilt evidence or duringjury deliberations. 221 Specifically, focusing
on those jurors who decided upon death prematurely, the study found that "[m]any
early pro-death jurors appear to have operated under a presumption that unequivocal
proof of guilt justified the death penalty. A number of early pro-death jurors
declared that either the law or their own personal views required them to impose
death when they determined unquestionable guilt. '222 To a certain extent a capital
juror's decision as to the appropriate punishment appears to be malleable.
Trifurcation is responsive because it refocuses the juror's attention to the issue
at hand. Separating the intent factors and statutory aggravating factors from the
nonstatutory aggravating factors, trifurcation reiterates that, although the defendant
has been found guilty of the underlying capital offense, the death penalty is not yet
an available punishment.223 Certainly for the juror who is under the mistaken
impression that the law requires the imposition of death upon finding the defendant
guilty, trifurcation will be elucidating.224 Even for jurors who base their decision for
death upon evidence during the guilt phase or personal beliefs, 225 trifurcation will
provide a final level of protection that will force each juror to ask once more
whether death is the appropriate punishment.
This research reveals defects with the capital jury so basic that a solution more
fundamental than trifurcation is required. Whatever that solution may be, it is
beyond the scope of this Note. Until that solution is implemented, trifurcation can
hopefully provide some measure of improvement.
B. Empirical Research: State Capital Cases
At the request of the Chair of the Senate Judiciary Committee, James Liebman,
Jeffery Fagan and Valerie West began a major research effort to study the
221. See id. at 1496 ("Thus, most early deciding jurors point to the presentation of guilt
evidence and to jury deliberations on guilt as the points at which they made up their
minds .... ).
222. Id. at 1497.
223. See 18 U.S.C. § 3593(e)(2) (2000) (requiring the jury to find a statutory aggravating
factor listed in § 3592(b)-(d) before imposing a sentence of death).
224. See Bowers, supra note 82, at 1497 (noting that "[a] number of early pro-death jurors
declared that either the law or their own personal views required them to impose death when
they determined unquestionable guilt").
225. See id. at 1499 ("In effect, a number ofjurors seemed to have a preconception that the
death penalty was the appropriate punishment for murder.").
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frequency with which relief was granted in state capital cases.226 The research
spanned twenty-three years and analyzed 5,760 state capital sentences and
4,578 capital appeals.227 While this research focused solely on state capital
cases, because of the overlap in terms of both procedure and substance, a
review of federal capital trials would have likely yielded similar results.
The results of the study are staggering. "More than two out of every three
capital judgments reviewed by the courts during the twenty-three-year study
period were found to be seriously flawed. 228  Of the 5,760 state capital
sentences, 4,578 were appealed to the state's highest court.229 In over forty
percent of these appeals, the state's highest court found serious error and
reversed the death sentence. 230 Moreover, of the death sentences that failed to
be overturned in state court, 599 of the remaining appeals reached federal
courts on a habeas petition.23' Of those 599 federal habeas petitions, over forty
percent were granted.232
The extremely high rate of error in state capital cases is worrisome in the
context of the federal capital trial. There is no reason to assume that simply
because the defendant is prosecuted pursuant to the FDPA that serious error is
any less likely to occur. The likelihood that error is also present in federal
capital trials is reinforced by the fact that the primary reason for serious error
was not particular to the state court system. In fact, the primary reason for
reversal was "egregiously incompetent defense lawyering. '2 33 There is nothing
to suggest that federal capital defendants somehow have access to higher
quality counsel. Moreover, the research found that the second leading reason
for reversal was "prosecutorial suppression of evidence. 2 34 Again, there is
226. See James S. Liebman et al., Broken System: Error Rates in Capital Cases 1973-1995
(2000), http://www.thejusticeproject.org/press/reports/pdfs/Errfor-Rates-in-Capital-Cases- 1973-
1995.pdf, at I (last visited Nov. 25, 2006) ("As this study documents... judicial review takes so
long precisely because American capital sentences are so persistent and systematically fraught
with error that seriously undermines their reliability.") (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
227. See id. at 2 (describing the scope of the study).
228. Id.
229. See id. at 5 ("Of the 5,760 death sentences imposed during the study period, 4,578
(79%) were finally reviewed on 'direct appeal' by a state high court.").
230. See id. ("Of those, 1,885 (41%; over two out of five) were thrown out because of
serious error....").
231. See Liebman, supra note 226, at 6 (noting the number of death sentences that reached
federal court on habeas petition).
232. See id. (noting that 40% were overturned for serious error).
233. See id. at 6 (noting that the most common error was "egregiously incompetent defense
lawyering").
234. Id. at 6.
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nothing to indicate that state capital cases are wrought with either more
ineffective defense attorneys or more prosecutorial misconduct.235  These
results are illuminating for the federal capital trial and support the argument for
trifurcation.
Trifurcation can hopefully reduce what appears to be persistent error in
federal capital trials. Regardless of one's stance on the death penalty,
separating the determination of death eligibility from the determination of
punishment is beneficial. The obvious benefit is that trifurcation forces the jury
to address squarely the issue of whether the government has established an
intent factor and a statutory aggravating factor beyond a reasonable doubt, thus
ensuring that only defendants who meet the statutory eligibility requirements
will be sentenced to death. Another benefit is that reducing error can hopefully
reduce the lengthy and expensive appeals process, while also increasing
confidence in the judicial system.
XI. Conclusion
Surprisingly, the recent Supreme Court opinions in Apprendi and Ring call
into question the very capital trial structure that heralded the return of the death
penalty in 1976. State legislatures, and later the FDPA, adopted bifurcation to
satisfy Eighth Amendment concerns that rendered prior death penalty schemes
unconstitutional.236 After Apprendi and Ring, however, some of the elements
of federal capital murder are adjudicated during the sentencing phase.237 This
235. This Note's point is not to disparage federal prosecutors. Rather, this Note simply
points out that data concerning the occurrence of prosecutorial misconduct at the state level is
likely transferable to the federal level. The federal capital murder trial of Zacarias Moussaoui
provides a recent example. On March 14, 2006, the trial judge halted the sentencing phase of
the trial after learning that a government lawyer, albeit not a part of the prosecution, had
violated rules concerning the coaching of witnesses. See Neil A. Lewis, Judge Calls Halt to
Penalty Phase of Terror Trial, N.Y. TIMES, March 14, 2006, at Al (quoting Judge Brinkema).
Judge Brinkema declared that "[i]n all my years on the bench, I've never seen a more egregious
violation of the rule about witnesses." Id.
236. See Bunin, supra note 4, at 244 (noting that state legislatures enacted bifurcated death
penalty statutes in order to satisfy the Eighth Amendment); Nathan A. Forrester, Judge Versus
Jury: The Continuing Validity ofAlabama 's Capital Sentencing Regime afier Ring v. Arizona,
54 ALA. L. REV. 1157, 1157 (2003) (noting that "[m]any states ... went to a bifurcated system"
after the death penalty was reinstated in 1976); Bunin, supra note 4, at 244 (noting that state
legislatures enacted bifurcated death penalty statutes in order to satisfy the Eighth Amendment).
237. See supra Part IV (discussing the problems associated with the current bifurcated
structure of federal capital trials).
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result violates the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights and also cuts against the
very core of criminal prosecution.238
The Supreme Court must reconcile its opinion in Ring with the current
structure of the FDPA. The impact of this decision could prove enormous.
While this Note focused solely on the FDPA, bifurcation pervades all death
penalty jurisdictions in America.239 This Note's arguments, therefore, may be
equally applicable to every death penalty statute. As bifurcation rescued the
death penalty in the past, perhaps trifurcation will be its savior in the future.
238. See Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 447 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting)
("Criminal prosecution involves two determinations: whether the defendant is guilty or
innocent, and what the appropriate punishment should be if he is guilty .... This case involves
the unfairness that may result from an attempt to merge the two stages.").
239. See Bunin, supra note 4, at 235 ("In most [state] death penalty cases, the existence of
statutory aggravating circumstances is not decided during the guilt phase of the trial, but rather
during the sentencing hearing."). In the following states, adjudication of aggravating factors
necessary to impose the death penalty occurs during the sentencing phase:
ALA. CODE § 13A-5-45(e), (f) (1981); ARiz. REV. STAT. § 13-703(G) (2001); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 5-4-602 (1993); CAL. PENAL CODE § 190 (2003); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 18-1.3-1201 (2003); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-54b (2003); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
11, § 4209 (2002); FLA. STAT. ch. 921.141 (2002); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-10-30
(2003); IDAHO CODE § 19-2515 (2001); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/9-1 (d) (2004); IND.
CODE § 35-50-2-9a (2001); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4624(b) (1994); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 532.025 (2001); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 905.3 (1988); MD. CODE ANN.,
CRIM. LAW § 2-303(b) (2003); MISS. CODE ANN. § 99-19-101 (2000); Mo. REV.
STAT. § 565.030 (2002); MONT. CODE ANN. § 46-18-305 line (2002); NEB. REV.
STAT. § 29-2520 (2004); NEV. REV. STAT. § 175.554 (2002); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 630:5 (IV) (1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 11-3 (c) (2002); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-
20A-1 (2002); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 400.27 (Consol. 2003); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 15A-2000 (2003); OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 701.11 (1987); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 163.150 (2001); PA. CONS. STAT. § 9711 (2003); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-20 (B)
(1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 23A-27A-4 (1979); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-204
(2002); TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. § 37.071 (2001); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-3-
207 (2003); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-264.4 (2003); Wvo. STAT. ANN. § 6-2-102
(2001).
Id. at 235 n.20.
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